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Introduction
The European Union (EU) has traditionally considered health and health systems to be subject to the subsidiarity principle, a view confirmed by successive European treaties. In practice, however, there are a number of health-related areas in which EU policies directly or indirectly provide a framework for national legislation or override national competence all together. Obvious cases involve public health activities such as epidemiological surveillance, control of communicable diseases and rules about labelling of tobacco products. In other areas the influence of EU law, although significant and growing, has been less visible; for example, the free movement of people in search of treatment abroad and the freedom to provide health services, including insurance, across national borders (Mossialos and McKee 2002) .
In 1992 the European Commission (hereafter referred to as 'the Commission') established a regulatory framework intended to enhance competition and consumer choice in markets for all types of non-life insurance including, for the first time, markets for health insurance. To facilitate the free movement of health and other nonlife insurance services throughout the single European market, the introduction of the third non-life insurance directive removed barriers to entry and outlawed various forms of government intervention. For example, governments can no longer impose price and product controls in private health insurance markets, except where these form a 'partial or complete alternative' to statutory health insurance (European Communities 1992) . This paper examines the implications of the single market in insurance for regulation of private health insurance in the European Union. In doing so it considers areas of uncertainty in interpreting the third non-life insurance directive (referred to here as 'the Directive'), particularly with regard to when and how governments may regulate private health insurance. As in other spheres of EU legislation, interpretation largely rests on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), so clarity may come at a high cost and after considerable delay. The paper also questions the Directive's capacity to promote consumer and social protection in health insurance markets. In many ways the Directive reflects the regulatory norms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, a time when boundaries between 'social security' and 'normal economic activity' were still relatively well defined in most member states (White 1999) . Today these boundaries are increasingly blurred, and as governments in old and new member states look to private health insurance to ease pressure on public budgets, uncertainty about the scope of the Directive and concerns about its restrictions on regulation are likely to grow.
Our study is based, where possible, on discussion of ECJ rulings and cases in which the Commission has considered national regulation of private health insurance to have infringed the Directive or contravened other forms of EU legislation. Where actual examples are lacking, our analysis is, inevitably, more speculative. In the following section we summarise the main changes brought about by the Directive and its initial impact on regulation of private health insurance in the European Union. A subsequent section examines the issue of uncertainty as to when and how governments can intervene in private health insurance markets (that is, where health insurance is voluntary and paid for privately by individuals and/or their employers). The paper concludes with a discussion of key points.
The introduction of the third non-life insurance directive and regulation of private health insurance in the European Union
Markets for health insurance suffer from inefficiencies triggered by the nature of health risks, asymmetrical information between insurers, consumers and regulators and the absence of perfect competition (Barr 1998) . As a result, voluntary (private) insurance rarely achieves an adequate quantity or quality of population coverage, a failure starkly illustrated in the United States, where one in three adults under the age of 65 has no health insurance, sporadic cover or cover that exposes them to high out of pocket health care costs (Schoen et al 2005) .
For efficiency and equity reasons governments intervene in markets for health insurance in several ways. Many choose to organise statutory (public) health insurance, typically combining compulsory risk pooling on a national or regional 6 scale with rules concerning levels of pre-payment through taxation or earmarked 'contributions', the range of services to be covered and the provision of benefits in kind (Rice 2001) . Some allow health insurance to operate on a private basis subject to regulation intended to protect consumers and improve access. Less direct intervention may involve subsidising the price of private cover or favouring particular insurersfor example, by giving tax breaks to non-profit entities.
The majority of EU member states provide universal or near universal public coverage for health as part of a wider system of 'social protection'. Private insurance offering 'supplementary' cover (see Table 1 ) accounts for less than 5% of total expenditure on health (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2003) . In some member states, however, private insurance also contributes to social protection, providing cover that substitutes for or complements statutory insurance.
Without this 'substitutive' and 'complementary' private cover, which may be purchased by large proportions of the population and usually accounts for 10-20% of total health expenditure, people would not be sufficiently protected from financial risks associated with ill health. Historically, the extent to which EU governments regulated private health insurance was determined by the role of private cover in the health system, aspects of market structure (such as the number and type of insurers in operation) and political ideology.
Two broad approaches prevailed: minimal financial or prudential regulation of supplementary markets, focusing on solvency levels, and heavier material regulation of substitutive markets, emphasising control of prices and products. While both approaches aimed to protect consumers from insurer insolvency 1 , material regulation also endeavoured to ensure access to health care. Under the subsidiarity principle governments were free to decide on the appropriate form of regulation required in a given context. In the last thirty years the Commission has successfully removed this freedom by introducing a series of directives aimed at creating a single market in insurance (European Communities 1973; European Communities 1988; European Communities 1992) . The first and second generation of insurance directives were limited to the cover of 'large risks' of a commercial nature considered small enough, in relation to the size or status of their policy holders, not to require special protection (for example, aviation or marine insurance and re-insurance) (Merkin and Rodger 1997; Mabbett 2000) . 'Mass risks' involving individuals and small businesses were excluded on the grounds that they required special protection because their policy holders would not normally have the ability to judge all the complexities of the obligation they undertook in an insurance contract (Nemeth 2001) . The third generation of insurance directives extended the application of single market legislation to all types of risks, including mass risks such as health insurance.
The third non-life insurance directive gives insurers full freedom to provide services throughout the European Union, with or without a branch presence, through the introduction of a single system for the authorisation and financial supervision of an insurance undertaking by the member state in which the undertaking has its head office ('home country control'); the mutual recognition of systems of authorisation and financial supervision; and the harmonisation of minimum solvency standards (European Communities 1992 with the cover provided by the statutory health insurance scheme at a premium rate at or below a prescribed maximum, participation in risk equalisation schemes (referred to as 'loss compensation schemes') and the operation of private health insurance on a technical basis similar to life insurance. Measures taken to protect the general good must be shown to be necessary and proportional to this aim; not unduly restrict the right of establishment or the freedom to provide services; and apply in an identical manner to all insurers operating within a member state.
Governments in Germany and the Netherlands have used article 54.1 to justify intervention in their substitutive markets, where risk selection by private insurers prevents some older people and people with chronic illnesses from buying an adequate and affordable level of private cover (Wasem 1995; Rupprecht et al 2000) .
Regulatory measures in both countries (prior to 2006 in the Netherlands) include the provision of lifetime cover, the introduction of policies with mandatory pooling, standardised minimum benefits, guaranteed prices and the establishment of direct or indirect cross subsidies from those with private to those with statutory coverage.
German private insurers are subject to further regulation concerning the way in which they fund substitutive cover (on a similar basis to life insurance) and the provision of information to potential and existing policy holders. The Irish market is also tightly regulated; insurers must offer open enrolment with community rating and the Minister of Health has the power to trigger a risk equalisation scheme if this is deemed necessary by an independent regulatory body.
In contrast, regulation of most markets for complementary and supplementary cover tends to focus on ex post scrutiny of financial returns on business to ensure that insurers remain solvent. Insurers are permitted to reject applications for cover, exclude cover of or charge higher premiums for individuals with pre-existing conditions, rate premiums according to risk, provide non-standardised benefit packages and offer annual contracts, while benefits are usually provided in cash rather than in kind.
Implications for government intervention in health insurance markets
At first sight the Directive appears to give governments significant scope for regulating private health insurance under the general good principle, which broadly refers to any legislation aimed at protecting consumers. On closer examination, however, interpretation of the principle is shown to be problematic in two areas: first, . Calls for further clarification persist on the grounds that the lack of a definition creates legal uncertainty, while the process of testing questionable use of the general good through the courts is prohibitively lengthy and expensive . We discuss interpretation of the general good in relation to when and how governments can intervene in markets for private health insurance.
When can governments intervene?
Uncertainty about when the general good can be invoked to justify material regulation arises from the need to distinguish between private health insurance that serves as a partial or complete alternative to statutory health insurance, as set out in article 54. But 'partial alternative' could be interpreted in other ways. For example, the logic behind allowing governments to intervene in substitutive markets is implicitly based on the assumption that purely financial regulation of private insurers' solvency levels will suffice for the purposes of consumer protection but will not be enough to ensure access to health care when private cover fulfils a social protection function. If this is the case, what are the implications for regulation of non-substitutive private health insurance that also fulfils this function?
Where the statutory benefits package (the basic social security package of cover mentioned by Bolkestein) is relatively narrow or subject to extensive co-payments, it could be argued that individuals do not have full protection from financial risks associated with ill health unless they purchase complementary private health insurance covering excluded (and effective) services and / or statutory user charges.
In such cases complementary cover provides a degree of social protection, thereby justifying material regulation to prevent private insurers from selecting risks, but rules to ensure affordable access to private cover might contravene the Directive. 
How can governments intervene?
The second area of uncertainty concerns the types of intervention that might be considered necessary and proportional. Article 54.2 and recitals to the Directive list the legal provisions governments can introduce where private cover provides a partial or complete alternative to statutory cover. However, it is not clear if the list should be understood as being exhaustive, in which case unlisted interventions would contravene the Directive; and again, there is the problem of interpreting partial or complete alternative. In this section we discuss interventions that have been disputed or may be contentious.
Financial transfers
Risk equalisation schemes are a direct form of intervention typically involving financial transfers from insurers with low risks to insurers with high risks. They are 
Benefits
Governments can regulate the benefits offered by private insurers by specifying a minimum level or standard package of benefits and / or requiring benefits to be provided in kind rather than in cash. The first intervention aims to facilitate price competition, while both aim to lower financial barriers and ensure access to a given range of health services.
Minimum or standard benefits
The Commission expected the single market in insurance to stimulate competition among insurers, precipitating efficiency gains and bringing consumers the benefits of wider choice and lower prices (European Commission 1998). A preamble to the Directive states that it is in policyholders' interest that they should have access to 'the widest possible range of insurance products available in the Community so that [they] can choose that which is best suited to [their] needs' (European Communities 1992).
In theory, product differentiation benefits consumers by providing policies tailored to meet particular needs and benefits insurers by allowing them to distinguish between high and low risk individuals. In practice, it may be detrimental to consumers in two ways. First, it gives insurers greater opportunity to select risks, leading to access problems for high risks. Second, making consumers choose from a wide range of highly differentiated products severely restricts competition, which only operates effectively where consumers find it easy to make informed comparisons about price and quality.
To encourage competition based on price and quality (rather than risk selection), regulators can require insurers to offer a standard package of benefits, use standardised terms when marketing products, inform potential and existing policy holders of all the price and product options open to them and provide consumers with access to centralised sources of comparable information. However, the Directive specifically outlaws product and price controls except where private health insurance constitutes a partial or complete alternative to statutory cover, and even in these circumstances control is limited to offering benefits standardised in line with statutory benefits; that is, the primary aim is to ensure that the privately insured have access to the same services as the publicly insured rather than to facilitate price competition.
For example, governments in Germany and the Netherlands have required private insurers to offer older policy holders benefits that match statutory benefits .
In the absence of product regulation, liberalisation of health insurance markets in some member states has been accompanied by rising levels of product differentiation, with evidence suggesting that consumers may be confused by the proliferation of products on offer . For example, an official investigation into information problems in the market for supplementary private health insurance in the United Kingdom found that increased product complexity did not benefit consumers; rather, consumers sometimes paid more than they should and often purchased inappropriate policies (Office of Fair Trading 1998). An OECD study noted that as the diversity of schemes in the UK market rose, consumers faced increasing difficulty in comparing premiums and products, a concern echoed by consumer bodies in other member states (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2001).
Perhaps due to limited price competition and private insurers' limited ability to control costs, prices appear to have gone up rather than down in many member states.
Research based on data from several member states shows that, during the 1990s, the compound annual growth rate of private health insurance premiums rose much faster than the average annual growth rate of total spending on health care .
Benefits in kind
The provision of benefits in kind enhances social protection by removing financial barriers to accessing health care. Bolkestein's letter suggests that the Dutch government's proposed requirement for insurers offering substitutive private health insurance to provide a basic package of benefits in kind could infringe the free 20 movement of services by creating barriers for non-Dutch insurers entering the market and might need to be assessed for proportionality and necessity (Bolkestein 2003: 3) .
This raises concerns not only for the new Dutch system, but for statutory and substitutive private health insurance in other member states.
Differential treatment of insurers
Under the Directive governments can no longer influence market structure (by restricting the provision of private health insurance to a single approved insurer or to statutory health insurance funds) or discriminate against particular types of insurer. it considered that the tax advantages granted to them were disproportionate to the burden they bore in undertaking such services, which only represented a small share of their activities (Palm 2002) . However, the Commission allowed the government to continue to make selective corporate tax provisions for non-profit organisations, as this was considered to be a normal part of the fiscal system. In Luxembourg the existence of a 'gentleman's agreement' between mutual associations and commercial insurers has prevented the latter from complaining about preferential tax treatment . The agreement rests on the understanding that mutual associations will not encroach on commercial insurers' dominance of the market for pensions and other types of insurance.
Some argue in favour of treating mutual associations differently on the grounds that they provide better access to health services because they offer open enrolment, lifetime cover and community-rated premiums, whereas commercial insurers restrict access by rejecting applications, excluding the cover of pre-existing conditions and risk rating premiums (Rocard 1999; Palm 2002) . In a market where mutual associations and commercial insurers operate side by side the latter may be able to undermine the former by attracting low risks with lower premiums, leaving mutual associations to cover high risks. However, while the distinction between non-profit and for-profit insurers is important in so far as an insurer's profit status determines its motivation and influences its conduct, in practice there is considerable variation in the way in which mutual associations behave; in some member states their conduct may be indistinguishable from the conduct of commercial insurers. As it is not possible to make assumptions about an insurer's conduct on the basis of its legal status it would be more appropriate to discriminate on the basis of conduct, favouring insurers who offer greater access to health services or, where appropriate, penalising those who restrict access.
Discussion and conclusions
The Bolkestein's definition of complementary cover fails to recognise that this type of private health insurance increasingly contributes to social protection for those who purchase it, operating in an unofficial partnership with statutory health insurance where it offers reimbursement of statutory user charges and / or provides access to effective health services excluded from the statutory benefits package. In particular, complementary cover of statutory user charges tends to be purchased by a relatively high proportion of the population, making it regressive in financing health care (because it is not restricted to richer groups) and creating inequalities in access to health care (Wagstaff et al 1999) .
If, as we have argued, the logic underlying article 54.1 is to permit material regulation where private health insurance fulfils a social protection function, then in either case obliging complementary insurers to offer open enrolment and community rating would be necessary to ensure equitable access to health care, while a risk equalisation scheme might be needed to lower incentives to select risks and to encourage 23 competition based on price and quality. The Irish experience highlights the complexity of the issues at stake and the difficulty caused by legal uncertainty.
In markets where private health insurance does not contribute to social protection the Directive assumes that financial regulation will be sufficient to protect consumers, but we have argued that solvency rules alone may not be adequate if health insurance products are highly differentiated. Information asymmetry exacerbated by product differentiation appears to be a growing problem in markets across the European Union and the Commission has not yet put in place mechanisms for monitoring anticompetitive behaviour by insurers.
Communications from the Commission have raised doubts about the compatibility of certain regulatory measures with competition rules; for example, the provision of benefits in kind. More attention should be paid to this issue, which could have significant implications for statutory as well as private health insurance.
The Directive reflects the regulatory norms of its time. When it was introduced in 1992 the Commission may have been convinced that it would provide ample scope for governments to protect consumers where necessary and would not jeopardise statutory arrangements. Article 54 would protect markets contributing to social protection, while in markets regarded as supplementary, the benefits of de-regulation (increased choice and competition resulting in lower prices) would outweigh concerns about consumer protection.
These assumptions are more problematic now, partly because there is no evidence to suggest that the expected benefits of competition have, as yet, materialised. Private health insurance premiums in many member states have risen rather than fallen in recent years, often faster than inflation in the health sector as a whole, while insurers' expansion across national borders has been limited to cross-border mergers and acquisitions rather than genuinely new entrants to the market . The assumptions are also problematic due to increased blurring of the boundaries between normal economic activity and social security; the latter is no longer the exclusive preserve of statutory institutions or public finance, a development likely to bring new challenges for policy makers.
